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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and

Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
13816

KIPP PHILLIPS, DENNIS HORN,
and JERRY MCCRIGHT,
Defendants and Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from the Court's memorandum decision upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, concerning the
regulation of pornographic material, and a finding of guilt
of each defendant for distributing pornographic material.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellants were convicted and sentenced in the Ogden
City Court and appealed their conviction to the Second
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. Each appellant
had been charged seperately for distributing pornographic
material under Utah Code Annotated, 76-10-1204, 1953, as
amended. Upon stipulation of the facts by counsel, the
cases were consolidated for decision, the sole issue being
the constitutionality of the statute. The Second District
Court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding, upheld the
City Court conviction, and held Utah Code Annotated,
76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, constitutional.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request this Court to set aside
the convictions on the grounds that the statute under which
they were convicted is unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants were convicted and sentenced in the Ogden
City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, Utah, for having distributed pornographic material, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended.
They appealed their convictions, and the matter was set for
trial de novo in the Second Judicial District Court with the
Honorable Calvin Gould presiding.
It was stipulated that the exhibits were obtained by
Ogden City Police officers from the appellants while acting
as employees of the Adult Book and Cinema Store in
Ogden, Utah. Whether the exhibits under a properly drafted
statute would be pornographic was not at issue in District
Court and is not at issue here.
Appellants moved to dismiss their complaints on the
ground that Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1204,
1953, as amended, is unconstitutional on its face, and of
no effect whatsoever. Counsel submitted written memorandums after which the Court issued its memorandum
decision holding the statute constitutional and finding each
appellant guilty as charged.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-10-1204,
1953, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE, INDEFINITE, AND OVERBROAD, IN SUCH A
WAY THAT SAID STATUTE VIOLATES THE APPELLANTS' RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Appellants are charged with knowingly distributing
pornographic material to others in violation of Section
76-10-1204 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as
amended.
Pornographic material is defined in Section 76-101203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as follows:
" 1 . Any material or performance is pornographic
if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary
community standards:
(a) Its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest; and,
(b) It goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in the description or
representation of nudity, sex, or excretion.
2. In any prosecution dealing with an offense relating to pornographic material or performances,
the question whether the predominant appeal of
material or of a performance is to prurient
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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interest shall be determined with reference to
average adults,.
3. Neither the prosecution nor the defense shall
be required to introduce expert witness testimony
concerning the pornographic character of the
material or performance which is the subject of a
prosecution of this part."

This definition leaves appellants in a hopeless quandry
in assessing the limits of protection provided by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution.
These provisions are set forth below:
First Amendment: Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...
Fourteenth Amendment: No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Article I, Section 15: No law shall be passed to
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of
the press.
The Utah law governing pornography was passed in
March, 1973 in an attempt to adopt a tough position on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pornography in light of the then existing decisions by the
United States Supreme Court; however the constitutional
concepts were vastly changed by a series of United States
Supreme Court decisions announced June 2 1 , 1973, beginning with Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, (1973).
I n Miller, the Court stated:
"We acknowledge however, the inherent dangers
of undertaking to regulate any form of expression.
State statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited. As a result,
we now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe
sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically
defined by the applicable state law as written or
authoritatively construed. A state offense must
also be limited to works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patiently offensive
way, and which taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." at page 430.
The Supreme Court then adopted the new guidelines
that are to be the minimum standard for state statutes to
constitutionally regulate obscene material, to-wit:
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
(b) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patiently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by the applicable state law; and,
(c) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, at page 431.
The Court stated:
"If a state law that regulates obscene material is
thus limited, as written or construed, the First
Amendment values applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate
courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." at page 4 3 1 .

In the wake of the Miller family of cases, there is not
any predictable application of the Utah statute to the plaintiff's commercial activities in distributing sexually oriented
materials without concrete legislative guidelines within the
mandate of Miller. The inherent vagueness of the existing
definition of obscenity in 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated, is not Constitutionally tolerable because of the holding
in Miller. First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive; government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
at 311 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371, U.S. 415 at 432433
(1963).
When a statute is void-for-vagueness both in the sense
that it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrest and conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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victions, it must be held unconstitutional. Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839,843
(1972.)
The problems of fair notice and chilling protected
speech are very grave by the existence of the statute. The
defendants are intimidated from exercising their First
Amendment rights without the fair notice and definitiveness required since Miller. The vague, abstract definitions
of obscenity in the statute carry no precision in proscribing
specific sexual conduct. The meaning of the statutory concepts of obscenity now existing must necessarily vary with
the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the person defining them. Miller does not permit the vagueness
that now exists by the threatening enforcement of 76-101204, Utah Code Annotated. The appellants are manifestly
unable to describe in advance, by reference to these laws,
the distinction between protected and unprotected speech.
The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that
"Constitutionally protected expression ... is often seperated
from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line." Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 at 66 (1963). The "dim
and uncertain line" is precisely what Miller requires be
eradicated from future obscenity litigation and the existing statute.
In the Ogden City Court's memorandum decision
when initially finding the appellants guilty, Judges Ziegler
and Taylor, (Roth did not participate), held that the words
nudity and sex as used in 76-10-1203 of the Utah Code,
would not in and of themselves meet the constitutional
test of Miller. The City Court then construed nudity and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sex, adopting the definitions set forth in 76-10-1202 of the
Utah Code.
It in interesting to note that those definitions relied on
by the City Court specifically apply only to the sale of
material to minors, if it were the legislature's intention to
have those definitions apply to the section under which the
appellants have been charged, why were the definitions
restricted to the statute which deals only with the sale of
harmful material to minors? See Utah Code Annotated 7610-1206, 1953, as amended.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that all criminal laws provide fair notice of "what
the State commands or forbids." See Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 37 L.
Ed. 446 (1973), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 453
(1969); Connally v. General Construction Company,
269
U.S. 385 (1962). Also see Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972), requiring that the definition of obscenity must
provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from
dissemination. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, commented upon the inability of
"fair notice" ever being established in obscenity statutes
by stating:
"In this context, even the most painstaking
efforts to determine in advance whether certain
sexually oriented expression is obscene must inevitably prove unavailing. For the insufficiency
of the notice compels persons to guess not only
whether their conduct is covered by a criminal
statute, but also whether their conduct falls withDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in the constitutionally permissable reach of the
statute. The resulting level of uncertainty is
utterly intolerable, not alone because it makes
'(b)ookselling ... a hazardous profession,' Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S., at 674 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting), but as well because it invites arbitrary and erratic enforcement of the law. (Citing
cases.)" at 475.
The appellants are required to act at their peril because
of the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute. This is an
intolerable consequence as a result of the cases decided by
the Supreme Court on June 21, 1973, which now compels
that 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated, be declared unconstitutional. No person, not even the most learned
judge much less the appellants, are capable of knowing in
advance of exercising their First Amendment rights what
sexual conduct will pass without prosecution under the
statute attacked herein. Because of the abstract definition
of obscenity that exists in this statute, it is facially unconstitutional within the meaning of Miller v. California. There
can be no probability of regularity in proscribing sexually
oriented materials until the Utah legislature establishes concrete legislation in this area similar to that suggested by
Chief Justice Burger referring to the Oregon and Hawaii
Statutes. See Miller v. California, footnote 6. To further
highlight the chilling effect that the present status of the
law has upon the appellants' First Amendment rights, it is
possible that the legislature may ultimately pass laws allowing adults access to any sexually explicit material^ so long
as the disseminator insultes such materials from unwilling
recipients and minors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Part II of the Miller decision does not attempt to define what is required by a judicial body in authoritatively
construing obscenity statutes. In Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, Part IV,
footnote 13, he stated:
"While the Court's modification of the Memoirs
test is small, it should still prove sufficient to invalidate virtually every state law relating to the
suppression of obscenity. For under the Court's
restatement, a statute must specifically enumerate
certain forms of sexual conduct, the depiction of
which is to be prohibited. It seems highly doubtful to me that state courts will be able to construe
state statutes so as to incorporate a carefully
itemized list of various forms of sexual conduct,
and thus to bring them into conformity with the
Court's requirements. Cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410, 419 (1971). The statutes of at least one
State should, however, escape the wholesale
validation. Oregon has recently revised its statute
to prohibit only the distribution of obscene
materials to juveniles or unconsenting adults.
The enactment of this principle is, of course, a
choice constitutionally open to every State even
under the Court's decision. See Oregon Laws,
1971, c 743, Art. 29." at 480.
It is clear from a reading of Miller v. California that
the California Obscenity Statute did not satisfy Chief Justice Burger's requirement that state statutes must be specifically definitive in describing proscribed sexual conduct.
Appellants respectfully submit that neither this Court nor
any other court of competent jurisdiction can supply, by
authoritative judicial construciton, the specific definition
in 76-10-1204,
Utah
Code
Annotated.
Digitized
by the Howard W.
Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

Under the present status of the law, we have a statute
which sweeps in a great variety of conduct under a general
and indefinite, abstract characterization of the "obscene."
Such a situation leaves the executive and judicial branches
too wide a discretion in applying the statute. Ashton v.
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966).
The appellants place significant emphasis upon Blount
v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); United States v. Evans, 333
U.S. 483 (1948); and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964).
In Blount v. Rizzi, supra, the Postmaster General,
pursuant to a federal statute, invoked administrative hearings
to halt the appellee's use of the mails in distributing alleged
obscene materials or from receiving postal money orders
for payment of the materials. After an administrative hearing, publications in question were found to be obscene. Two
seperate three-judge courts were convened and held that
the federal statute was unconstitutional on its face for failing to provide "prompt judicial review" within a brief
period of time to prevent the administrative decision from
achieving an effect of finality. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Government suggested that the Constitutional
questions raised by the failure of the statute to provide
prompt judicial review be saved by construing the statute
to deny the administrative order any effect until judicial
review was sought by the distributor. In rejecting the
Government's position, the Court stated:
"... it is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite
the statute."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. at 420.
In ILS. v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948), the defendants
had been charged with harboring aliens in violation of a
federal statute. The District Court dismissed the indictment
on the basis that the statute did not specify with any clarity
the punishment that was to be prescribed for the offense.
On appeal, the government argued that the legislative intent
to proscribe the conduct was clear and that the ambiguity
concerning the penalty could be resolved by construction
of the statute. In opposing the Government's position, the
defendants contended that the task of resolving the
difficulty went beyond dispelling ambiguity in the usual
sense of judicially construing statutes and, if attempted,
would require the Supreme Court to invade the legislative
function and, in effect, fix the penalty." The Government's
preferred reading of the statute was rejected by the
Supreme Court. In affirming the dismissal of the indictment,
the Court stated:
"In our system, so far at least as concerns the
federal powers, defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial functions.
"But to resolve it broadside (the ambiguity in the
statutes) now for all cases the section may cover,
on this indirect presentation, would be to proceed in an essentially legislative manner for the
definition and specification of the criminal acts,
in order to make a judicial determination of the
scope and character of the penalty.
3|e >|c ^

^ c :+c
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"It may well be, as the Government infers, that
this only increases the mystery of Congress' failure to include explicit penalties when it added
the new offenses. It is possible that Congress may
have thought none were needed. But that view
hardly explains satisfactorily the subsequent
repeated failure to clarify the matter, after experience had shown that need. We cannot take
them as importing clear direction to the courts
to do what Congress itself either refused or failed
on notice to do upon so many occasions and
opportunities.

"With both of the parties we agree that Congress
meant to make criminal and to punish acts of
concealing or harboring. But we do not know, we
can only guess with too large a degree of uncertainity, which one of the several possible constructions Congress thought to apply.

"This is a task outside the bounds of judicial
interpretation. It is better for Congress, and more
in accord with its function, to revise the statute
than for us to guess at the revision it would make.
That task it can do with precision. We could do
no more than make speculation law.
ILS. v. Evans, 333 U.S. at 486, 490, 492, 495.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964), the Supreme Court held that the federal statute
denying Communists the right to obtain passports for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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foreign travel was overbroad and unconstitutional. In refusing to save the statute, the Court observed:
"It must be remembered that although this court
will often strain to construe legislation so as to
save it against constitutional attack, it must not
and will not carry this to the point of perverting
the purpose of a statute ... or judicially rewriting
it. (Citing cases.) To put the matter another way,
this court will not consider the abstract question
of whether Congress might have enacted a valid
statute but instead must ask whether the statute
that Congress did enact will permissibly bear a
construction rendering it free from constitutional
defects.
' T h e clarity and preciseness of the provision in
question makes it impossible to narrow its indiscriminately cast and overly broad scope without
substantially rewrite."
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. at 515.
Within the reading of Miller v. California, 76-10-1204,
Utah Code Annotated may only be saved under the guise of
judicial construction. It is respectfully submitted that it
would be improper for this Honorable Court to undertake
such a legislative function, as such action would be contrary
to the holdings in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971);
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948); and Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
Miranda v. Hicks (U.S. District Court California) decided June 4, 1974, also gives insight as to judicial conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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struction of a statute and the sufficiency of the California
statute in particular. In Hicks the three-judge panel for the
Ninth Circuit declared the California statute in light of
Miller unconstitutional on its face and that the judicial construction given to the statute post Miller was not sufficient
to meet the fair notice requirements of Miller. Reference is
also made in the Hicks case to other state statutes which
have been declared unconstitutionally vague in light of Miller,
In Hicks, the United States District Court said, "Given
the particularities that the California statute is missing on
its face, it may be that such an undertaking would go beyond the pale of judicial construction and cross over into
the realm of legislative drafting."
The Hicks court also rejected the argument made by
the State that United States v. 12 200 foot Reels of Film
permits the type of construction urged upon this Court by
stating:
"If the Supreme Court by that passing reference
was announcing new boundaries for the legislative
and judicial domains, it is clear that it at best
applies only to the particular power the Supreme
Court has to construe federal statues. Without
more, that narrow statement can be of no relevance to this determination. For the example of
another court unwilling to construe this footnote as an invitation to repose legislative power
in the judiciary, see the opinion of the Loisiana
Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Shreveport News
Agency, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2344 (January 8,
1974)."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Other jurisdictions have construed obscenity statutes
and ordinances in light of Miller v. California. See Mohney
v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 66 (1973); Stroud v. Indiana, 300
N.E. 2d 100, (1973); Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan,three
judge court (D.C.NJ. July 26, 1973); Redlich v. Capri
Cinema, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 811, (1973); Papp v. Florida, 281
So. 2d 600, (1973); United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp.
380 (1973); and Literature, Inc. et al v. Quinn, 482 F. 2d
(1973).
The appellants respectfully call this Court's attention
to the most significant pronouncement of the Indiana
Supreme Court in Mohney v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 66, and
Stroud v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 100, (1973). In Mohney.
supra, and Stroud, supra, the Indiana Supreme Court in a
pre-Miller decision held the Indiana Obscenity Statute to
be constitutional and affirmed the trial court convictions
of Stroud and Mohney. See Stroud v. State, 273 N.E. 2d
842, (1971), and Mohney v. State, 276 N.E. 2d 517 (1971).
A Petition for Certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court and on June 25, 1973, the judgments of the
Indiana Supreme Court were vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Miller v. California. See
Strqud_v. Indiana, 93 S.Ct. 3038 (1973), and Mohney v.
Indiana, S.Ct. 3040 (1973). On remand, the Indiana
Supreme Court after citing the United States Supreme
Court obscenity decision of June 2 1 , 1973, held:
"The main thrust of these opinions, so far as
applicable to his case, is that the statute under
which the appellant was convicted is unconstitutional for the reason that it is too general in
nature and does not set out specific, the sexual
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or obscene acts which, when depicted in any of
the media named by the statute, constitute a
violation of the statute.
"Pursuant to the order and direction of the
United States Supreme Court we hold the statute
involved in this case as unconstitutional on the
grounds announced by that court."
Stroud, supra, and Mohney, supra, slip op. page 2.
The appellants also contend that of the three guidelines required as a minimum of every state statute in Miller,
the new Utah law is totally silent with respect to the requirements that (b) the material is patently offensive; and (c)
the material lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Remember, this is required as a minimum.
Utah does allow as an affirmative defense to the charge
of distributing pornographic material, distribution of
material when restricted to institutions or persons having
scientific, educational, governmental, or other similar
justifications for possessing pornographic material. See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1208, 1953, as
amended. The State may argue that this section satisfies
the (c) requirement of Miller. In fact it does not even come
close. It was never intended by the Miller requirement to
make it a burden of proof of the defendant, but a burden
of limitation of the State in constitutional statutory
construction. Furthermore, Section 1208 is referring to
pornographic material which can legally be distributed and
the Miller requirement, by definition, is creating a minimum
standard for material to constitutionally be declared pornoggraphic vel non.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In other words, in Utah it would be legal to sell
material that was in fact pornographic under the Miller
requirements, so long as it was sold for the purposes referred to in section 1208. While there may be some value in
that section, it certainly does not contain the Miller
criteria as to whether material is pornographic vel non.
It cannot be argued by the State that the material
sold by the appellants would be in violation of the Miller
requirements anyway, and therefore, they would not be
prejudiced by conviction, even if Utah's statute were lacking in some particulars. It was held in Lewis v. New Orleans,
39 L. Ed. 2d 214 at 219 (1974) that, "when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution; ... the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow
specifically."
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76 10-1204, 1953, as
amended, is unconstitutional on its face by failing to
conform to the procedural and specificity requirements of
Miller v. California,,
Respectfully submitted,
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON
BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Appellants
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